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Political scientists and law professors have lately taken to asserting 
that quantitative studies of judging reveal worrisome findings about the 
rule of law in the U.S. judicial system. The authors of Are Judges 
Political? declare: “variations in panel composition lead to 
dramatically different outcomes, in a way that creates serious problems 
for the rule of law.”1 The authors of Judging on a Collegial Court 
similarly conclude: 
Because separate opinions and reversals constitute behavioral 
manifestations of judges’ discretionary authority, studies of dissensus 
shed light on critical questions related to the effective functioning and 
legitimacy of our legal system and the operation of the rule of 
law. . . . Our findings cut both ways. The evidence we have presented 
in the preceding pages of this book demonstrates that judging is both 
a legal and a political activity . . . .2 
Surveying the results of recent quantitative studies of judging, Cass 
Sunstein and Thomas Miles observe that “[f]or those who believe in 
the rule of law, and in the discipline imposed by the legal system, the 
results of the New Legal Realism need not be entirely discouraging. 
The glass is half empty, perhaps, but it is also half full.”3 
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The rule of law is often said to be a defining aspect of the 
American system of governance—the foundation stone of our free 
society—in which judges play a pivotal role.4 It is alarming to be 
informed that serious problems in judging threaten the rule of law or 
that the rule of law glass is half empty. If these concerns are valid, 
remedial measures must be sought and implemented without delay. 
But are they correct? Have studies of judging shown that the rule 
of law is in trouble? To evaluate these assertions, one must first know 
what the rule of law requires of judges; then one must identify or 
measure how much and in what ways judges are falling short of these 
requirements. To say that the rule of law glass is half full, continuing 
with Sunstein’s and Miles’s metaphor, requires knowing what a full 
glass of the rule of law looks like: there must be rule of law baselines 
or standards. 
A quick look at these studies exposes the need for such baselines. 
The authors of Are Judges Political? find that “[f]requently the law is 
clear, and judges should and will simply implement it, no matter who 
has appointed them.”5 Their study provides “considerable evidence to 
suggest that they do exactly that”;6 in five major areas studied they find 
no ideological effect on judicial decisions, and even when an effect did 
show, the differences, they admit, were “not huge.”7 A study was not 
necessary to show that judges do not vary greatly by ideology in their 
legal decisions because typically about 90 percent of federal appellate 
decisions (more when unpublished cases are counted) are issued 
without a dissent. Judges, then, agree an overwhelming proportion of 
the time regardless of ideological differences. By that measure, at least, 
the rule of law appears to be working well. 
The authors of Judging on a Collegial Court find that ideological 
differences show a statistically significant increase in the probability of 
a dissent or a concurrence. But it turns out that the size of the effect—
its actual impact on the run of decisions—was minuscule: “The 
difference in absolute terms is rather small, with slightly less than a 0.01 
increase in the probability of a concurrence and a 0.02 increase in the 
 
844 (2008). 
 4. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 2, 104 
(2004) (explaining that “the defining characteristic of the Western political tradition is ‘freedom 
under the rule of law’” and discussing the role of judges in “find[ing] a balance” between 
individual freedom and the rule of law). 
 5. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 129. 
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probability of a dissent.”8 That is hardly worrisome. Confounding the 
authors’ expectations, furthermore, their study finds no statistically 
significant correlation between ideological difference and rates of 
reversal—that is, appellate panels did not reverse trial judges with an 
opposing ideological disposition at a higher rate. This study, covering 
decisions by nearly a thousand judges over four decades, would appear 
to confirm that political views have little impact on judicial decisions, 
yet, without explaining why, the authors suggest that their findings “cut 
both ways” on the rule of law. 
Behind the disquieting assertions about the rule of law lies an 
unstated assumption: the proposition that any finding of political 
influence on judging, no matter how small, is contrary to the rule of 
law. This, however, is a profoundly unrealistic assumption—ironically 
so, because these political scientists and law professors claim the 
mantle of legal realism. 
I.  BALANCED REALISM ABOUT JUDGING 
For more than a century, judges and jurists in the United States 
have expressed a view of judging that I call “balanced realism.”9 
Balanced realism recognizes that there are gaps and uncertainties in 
the law, that sometimes judges have discretion and must make choices, 
that different judges can sometimes interpret the same law in different 
ways owing to differences in perspective and background, that 
inconsistent precedents or conflicts in the applicable law can exist, and 
that sometimes judges manipulate the law to reach desired ends. (I call 
these factors the “skeptical aspects.”) But balanced realism also 
recognizes that a substantial majority of the time, the rules and their 
application are clear and predictable, that judges are indoctrinated into 
a shared legal tradition and legal practices that lead then to interpret 
and apply legal rules in similar ways, that judging takes place in a thick 
institutional setting that constrains judges, that most judges strive to 
abide by the commitment to follow the law, and that the overwhelming 
majority of judicial decisions are legally determined (the “rule-bound” 
aspects). Balanced realism acknowledges the limitations inherent in 
the law and in human judges—limitations that cannot be eliminated—
yet it also recognizes that law nonetheless works, that judges can and 
do render rule-bound decisions. 
 
 8. HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 2, at 65.  
 9. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 6–7 (2010). 
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Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously articulated a balanced realism 
about judging in The Nature of the Judicial Process: 
No doubt there is a field within which judicial judgment moves 
untrammeled by fixed principles. Obscurity of statute or of precedent 
or of customs or of morals, or collision between some or all of them, 
may leave the law unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare 
it retrospectively in the exercise of a power frankly legislative in 
function.10 
Cardozo insisted that when making these decisions a judge must decide 
in terms of the community view, not the judge’s personal view, but he 
was aware that it is difficult to keep the two apart: “The perception of 
the objective right takes the color of the subjective mind.”11 But despite 
the inherent openness of law and the limitations of human judges, 
Cardozo reminded his audience, “[w]e must not let these occasional 
and relatively rare instances blind our eyes to the innumerable 
instances where there is neither obscurity nor collision nor opportunity 
for diverse judgment.”12 
Multiple judges before and after Cardozo have described judging 
in similar terms. In 1886, for example, Judge Thomas Cooley 
emphasized that uncertainty in the application of law cannot be 
eliminated 
because in the infinite variety of human transactions it becomes 
uncertain which of the opposing rules the respective parties contend 
for should be applied in a case having no exact parallel, and because 
it cannot possibly be known in advance what view a court or jury will 
take of questions upon which there is room for difference of 
opinion.13 
Differences in the judicial application of law, he wrote, “must always 
exist so long as there is variety in human minds, human standards, and 
human transactions.”14 In 1924, Judge Irving Lehman acknowledged 
that “no thoughtful judge can fail to note that in conferences of the 
court, differences of opinion are based at least to some extent upon 
differences of viewpoint.”15 Judge Bernard Shientag remarked in 1944, 
 
 10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921). 
 11. Id. at 110–11. 
 12. Id. at 129. 
 13. Thomas M. Cooley, Another View of Codification, 2 COLUM. JURIST 464, 465 (1886). 
 14. Id. at 465–66. 
 15. Irving Lehman, The Influence of the Universities on Judicial Decisions, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 
1, 6 (1924). 
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[n]aturally, it is in cases where the creative faculty of the judicial 
process operates, where there is a choice of competing analogies, that 
the personality of the judge, the individual tone of his mind, the color 
of his experience, the character and variety of his interests and his 
prepossessions, all play an important role.16 
Judge Albert Tate observed in 1959, “like all other human 
beings[, judges] have limitations, of vision, knowledge, intelligence, or 
predisposition which sometimes influence their judicial actions.”17 In 
1963, Judge Charles Clark admitted that cases arise in which there is 
no clear legal answer, and the judge “is on his own for the ultimate 
result which must reflect his background, his personality, and his inner 
convictions.”18 And so on. 
This encapsulates what many judges have said about judging: the 
bulk of the law is clear, but the law has a margin of uncertainty; judges 
try their best to rule in an objective fashion, but their personal views 
sometimes seep through to influence their decisions. The crucial point 
is that law cannot be made perfectly certain and judges cannot be made 
to reason like machines, entirely free of background influences. These 
inherent aspects of judging shape and constrain what is possible. “The 
rule of law is not the doctrine of perfect decision,” Judge Alvin Rubin 
counseled: “[I]n many cases a conscientious decision is as much as can 
be expected, and . . . there is no ultimate ‘right’ answer.”19 
Now it is possible to identify the fundamental flaw in the 
assumption that any showing of political influence on judicial decisions 
is inconsistent with the rule of law. A realistic understanding of the rule 
of law would assume that a certain irreducible amount of ideological 
influence will be present even in the best system of judging.20 As judges 
have repeatedly stated, it cannot be otherwise. A realistic view would 
therefore expect that quantitative studies will find statistically 
significant correlations in certain contexts between ideology and 
judicial decisions. This finding in itself, without more, says nothing at 
all about the rule of law, because it is an inherent aspect of judging. Or 
to put the point another way, a full glass of the rule of law, like a full 
 
 16. BERNARD L. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 51 (1944). 
 17. Albert Tate, Jr., Forum Juridicum: The Judge as a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 439 (1959). 
 18. Charles E. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1963). 
 19. Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448, 453–54 (1976). 
 20. Nor is it clear that the legal system would be better if these aspects could be eliminated. 
These factors, the openness of law and the influence of background views of judges, help law 
change in sync with changes in society. 
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glass of milk, is not filled to the brim. The open space between the lip 
of the glass and the surface of a full glass of the rule of law is where 
legal uncertainty interacts with the limitations of human judges—
where political influences typically come into play. 
For the rule of law, what matters is the size of the ideological effect 
and in what contexts it manifests itself: whether it is greater than, or 
extends beyond or outside of, what one would expect in a well 
functioning system of rule-bound judging. Rule of law baselines are 
necessary to identify what to expect of a full glass of the rule of law. 
Quantitative studies can raise serious concerns about the rule of law 
only if their results establish that judicial decisions fall measurably 
below these baselines. Only then would grounds exist to assert that the 
rule of law glass is half full, or nearly empty. 
II.  CONSTRUCTING RULE OF LAW BASELINES 
Throughout this Essay, I have referred to baselines in the plural 
because a number of standards will be necessary to account for 
variations in the nature of legal provisions and the circumstances of 
judging. Two factors have particular bearing on the formulation of 
standards: the type of legal issue a judge is called upon to decide, and 
the level of the court. 
In connection with the first factor, certain legal provisions—
especially legal standards like “fairness,” “reasonableness,” or “the 
best interests of the child”—explicitly call upon judges to exercise 
discretion or to make judgments of a type that allows or invites (or 
makes it harder to screen out) the expression of personal views. 
Consequently, a rule of law baseline for this type of question, which 
remains legally governed and hence should manifest a significant 
degree of agreement, would anticipate greater variation among judges 
and higher correlations between their decisions and their ideological 
views in comparison to a rule of law baseline for narrow legal rules. 
The second factor recognizes that the quantum of legal 
uncertainty is greater at higher court levels. The vast majority of cases 
are settled (fewer than two percent of federal cases make it through 
trial) because the applicable law and provable facts are clear, so both 
parties can weigh the expected costs and benefits of continuing. About 
ten to fifteen percent of federal appellate cases, by the estimate of a 
number of federal judges,21 involve hard or uncertain legal issues. In 
 
 21. See TAMANAHA, supra note 9, at 125–31, 144. 
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contrast, the skeptical aspects of law recognized by balanced realism—
uncertainty, disagreement, choice, political pressure—show up in a 
significantly higher proportion of Supreme Court cases, whereas the 
rule-bound aspects are proportionally less present (including fewer 
institutional checks). This represents a virtual inversion of the usual 
balance of these factors within law and judging generally, although 
Supreme Court decisionmaking is still thickly draped in legal 
constraints. In recognition of these differences, rule of law baselines for 
trial courts and appellate courts should anticipate far greater 
agreement in legal decisions and significantly lower ideologically 
correlated variations in comparison with high courts (both state and 
federal). 
Needless to say, the task of formulating rule of law baselines will 
be complicated, requiring ingenuity and much trial and error. This task 
can be done in a variety of ways, all contestable. Every baseline 
produced should be viewed with caution, as a proxy that stands for an 
approximation of an abstraction—a gross quantitative marker for what 
to expect from rule-bound judges. 
Seeking out comparative measures is one way to proceed. For 
example, assume that over a seventy-five-year span conservative 
judges vote in the conservative direction in about fifty-five percent of 
their cases, whereas liberal judges vote conservative in about fifty 
percent of their cases.22 The relatively small five percent difference in 
voting behavior, one might surmise, reflects the irrepressible 
interaction of legal uncertainty with human judging. This historical 
norm could supply the basis for a rule of law baseline for federal 
appellate judging. A warning sign that the judicial system is in trouble, 
then, might be if judges as a group skew their votes in a one-sided 
ideological direction in a significantly higher proportion of cases, 
creating a greater than usual disparity between Republican- and 
Democratic-appointed judges.23 Moreover, individual judges whose 
decisions fall far outside of this historical range might invite scrutiny 
for failing to rule in a sufficiently rule-bound fashion. One might create 
similar baselines for the Supreme Court, derived from historical norms 
or from a comparison of the voting patterns of Justices against one 
another. This would allow a determination of whether a particular 
 
 22. This example is a simplified and modified version of a study reported by Judge Richard 
Posner. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 21 (2008). 
 23. With respect to voting trends, Judge Posner’s study indeed shows an increase in the 
ideological disparity among currently sitting judges. Id. 
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Court or a particular Justice shows a propensity to rule in an 
ideological direction that exceeds the usual, historical range. 
Setting aside levels of courts, one might also compare differences 
across legal issues to see whether some issues show greater 
ideologically linked divergence in judicial decisions than others. 
Applying different rule of law baselines for standards (expecting 
greater divergence) and for rules (expecting less) will make it possible 
to tease out whether the observed increase in divergence is a function 
of the type of legal provision at issue, or of something else (perhaps 
political salience or entrenched cognitive biases). 
These are just illustrative suggestions. Many factors must be 
considered before rule of law baselines can be constructed—work that 
has not yet begun. 
III.  LEGITIMATE OBJECTIONS TO RULE OF LAW BASELINES 
Critics may object that it is misguided or wrong to construct such 
baselines, that the goal itself is ludicrous because the rule of law is a 
deeply contested ideal with uncertain meaning and implications for 
judging. Furthermore, critics might argue, quantitative standards that 
purport to provide a basis to evaluate judging will compress the 
complexity and nuance of judging in a distorting oversimplification that 
is susceptible to pernicious uses. These are compelling objections. I 
would not proffer this proposal but for the worry that leaving this gap 
unaddressed might be worse than the distortions that result from the 
effort to fill it. 
As the first paragraph of this Essay reveals, political scientists and 
law professors, perhaps succumbing to the temptation to sell their 
results, have issued broad, alarming claims about the implications of 
their quantitative studies for the rule of law. These claims, I have 
argued, do not follow from the results of their studies in the absence of 
rule of law baselines, and they paint a false image of the state of 
judging. Rule of law baselines will impose greater discipline on scholars 
who wish to draw out broader implications from their results and will 
provide a sounder footing for their observations. 
This effort will also lead to an important advance in the discipline 
of quantitative studies. Quantitative scholars demonstrate time and 
again through their studies that judging is not a purely legal activity. 
This point is not informative. Dozens of judges have admitted for 
decades that sometimes law is uncertain or runs out, that judges must 
sometimes make choices, and that sometimes their personal views have 
TAMANAHA POST MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018  7:48 PM 
2018] DEVISING BASELINES IN STUDIES OF JUDGING 217 
an impact on their legal decisions.24 That is the nature of law and of 
human judging. The formulation of rule of law baselines would 
constitute a major advance within the field, because these baselines 
would formally incorporate the recognition of this reality, affecting the 
orientation and design of the next generation of studies. Future 
quantitative studies would produce information worthy of attention, 
not when merely finding indications of ideological influence, but when 
finding a notable deviation from expected baselines. Absent rule of law 
baselines, these rapidly multiplying studies will merely confirm what 
everyone in law already knows. 
 
 
 24. See TAMANAHA, supra note 9, chs. 7–8. 
